Yes. I have mentioned some of them here and elsewhere. Once I’m satisfied with my deconstruction here, I will attempt to show them as reasonable categories of “human knowing,” and how they are allies and adjuncts to sensation, reason, etc.

I’m not, again, suggesting the replacement of empirical investigation — that would be foolish and unfounded — it’s a necessity. It has though taken up too high a throne, thanks to the Positivist movement that is so present in science, and for many is the SOLE way of knowing. Dangerous.

I will go into more detail in my time, again, once I’ve beaten down the edifice (at least, insomuch as I’m able to appease my conscience)…

However, you’ve declined my invitation to share your own views, epistemological, ontological, or otherwise.

This is what is so effective about empirical observation and especially the scientific method, it can be checked and re-checked. Many people may be consulted.

Do you have additional methods or “checks” that you wish to employ. Please state your case for them positively.

I don’t think though, however you slice it, the argument I’m making can be easily thwarted. A logical fallacy is a logically fallacy. Reading him “very carefully” will help to extract rich meaning. Perhaps more accurate meaning. I think, what I pointed to the first half of this post, is however, painfully obvious. Careful reading should simply show more clearly that this is so.

The fact you think Hume would say that both methods are probabilistic, again, only validates my big point: only relying on one “method” is intellectually indefensible. What are needed are checks and balances — we are lacking some checks and balances in the modern day.

You mention differing interpretations. Would some interpretations not see him incorrect, almost entirely? Sure we can talk about what other commentators might think — and possibly get no where. Or we can confront the ideas ourselves. We might still get no where, but at least we will have made an investment. I think to this account a not worthless investment has been made.

Though my observation might be gross, simplistic, or juvenile, I do not think it should be so easily dismissed.

He would probably say that both are probabilistic, along with any other way of knowing.

Let me reiterate, Hume must be read very carefully. There are differing interpretations and a great deal of scholarship on the man.

Nevertheless, the rest of the critique still stands: in terms of conclusions we can come to through sensation, and subsequent refinement through judgment, the safest place we can come to is “probability.”

So, he, at that point anyway, agrees with mine: we can know somethings, and even be right in some areas, but all we are left with is probability, great though it may be. Thus, we treat sensual investigations with some level of sobriety and scrutiny.