philosophy in science: section 7
Let’s throw around some ideas about truth, and what actually makes one “valid.” A skeptical person asks, “Well, what good is it? So what if there is truth outside the reach of the scientific method? No one will agree on it! It’s a waste of time.”
This kind of response reveals an ever present presumption which underpins the hard scientific impetus, and it is one I’ve not yet heard discussed. It is this:
“Truth is only valuable if every one has the potential to agree with it. No one’s demanding that you do agree, but if there is no evidence, if there are no meaningful experiments, you don’t even give dissenters the possibility of being convinced, and you’ll just wind up in a relativistic hubbub.”
This can be nothing else but a presumption, and it lies at the heart of the scientific process. That is, the value or quality of a truth is tied to the potential for every human to embrace it, or, whether it is a candidate for universal agreement. This then means that a truth, even if only subscribed to by one person is inconsequential, regardless of whether it is truth or not. The ultimate distillation of that is that truth is in and of itself, irrelevant.
Why should that be the case? What reasonable basis is there for such an assertion, apart from the “Well, people won’t have any concrete reason to agree with you,” argument.” There is no reasonable basis to make an indictment against a truth itself on account of my or anyone else’s inability to report on it. But again, this is assumed in one of the critical pillars that the scientific method rests on.
Let’s refer back to what I began this series with: the inherent limitation of our ability to intake data and create knowledge, but from a completely different perspective.
We encounter the world. And yes, we can (and do) go on to deduce quite a bit, and can have a certain amount of confidence in our discoveries – and this confidence is not always ill-placed. However, that which is presented to our senses does not offer any sort of narrative or background story or user manual that fits within the scientific model. We find things as they are and can only deduce so much. Is it not reasonable to assume that what we cannot discover, by manner of inherent limitation (physical) or imposed limitation (philosophical) could potentially offer, were it to be known, context and completeness? And, could possibly this “whatever-it-is,” hidden from sensation yet open to other approaches, count for something?
It is an entirely feasible and reasonable hypothesis that there are principals that impinge on the workings of the observable Universe that we cannot from our vantage point observe. It is not a scientific hypothesis, but ultimately, that is irrelevant. Science can not explore what we do not, in some way, have the capacity to sense. Science, again, cannot answer every why.
If we cannot sense something, we can then also not be certain, in scientific terms, of the effect that thing may or may not have on us and the Universe.
We cannot look-in-to consequences when we are unable to even take notice of a catalyst. One can’t stare into the void and discern what does not reach out to him. The point, ultimately, is not that science is useless – it is that science has its uses. It is typically pragmatic, and in its greatest moments of success, give us some information about some phenomenon – maximal probability. There has been no Universal tribunal to declare in a fully objective and omniscient way that the scientific method is all its die-hard proponents claim it to be. In fact, you will see in the next section, how science, as a hypothesis, is actually unscientific.
philosophy in science: introduction
philosophy in science: section 1
philosophy in science: section 2
philosophy in science: section 3
philosophy in science: section 4
philosophy in science: section 5
philosophy in science: section 6
philosophy in science: section 7
philosophy in science: section 8
philosophy in science: conclusion
tags: philosophy, science
November 26th, 2007 at 9:24 pm
“Why should that be the case? What reasonable basis is there for such an assertion, apart from the “Well, people won’t have any concrete reason to agree with you,” argument.” There is no reasonable basis to make an indictment against a truth itself on account of my or anyone else’s inability to report on it. But again, this is assumed in one of the critical pillars that the scientific method rests on.”
The consequences for this line of reasoning though are dangerous. Telling people that you have a secret that you can not corroborate in any way but that is nonetheless true places no limit on what you can tell them. This is the sort claim that a cult leader might make. Right next to me now is a pink elephant that tells me you must give me all your money or he will surely kill you. This is true even though I cannot prove it. Give me your money, the pink elephant demands it!
According to your reasoning, you cannot refute my truth claim. Now pay up. Your inability to see the pink elephant does not excuse you!
November 27th, 2007 at 8:41 am
“The consequences for this line of reasoning though are dangerous. Telling people that you have a secret that you can not corroborate in any way but that is nonetheless true places no limit on what you can tell them.”
Any time we approach the issue of truth danger is involved. Not accepting a truth because to few people are testifying could be equally dangerous.
Danger aside, the argument is still valid — many people believe that the more people subscribe to a truth, the better it is.
I mean, take Galileo. Most people in his day believed the earth was the centre of the solar system. Yes, he had evidence, but that didn’t matter — there was no capacity for people to believe him (because of a philosophical limitation). Proof, even of a scientific kind, was not sufficient (I believe the reverse is true today, and that most only view scientific evidence as the only kind — just as dangerous).
So, did the capacity or potential for belief negate that truth? Not having a multitude agreeing with you does not have any impact on the value or quality of that truth. Truth is not a democracy.
Of course someone can lie and make things up… but that wouldn’t be a truth. Besides, people don’t need a philosophical excuse from me to manipulate anyway.
So then the question is, well, how do you KNOW that person is being truthful or is correct? They could just be persuasive or a master at deception.
Well, Galileo wasn’t… there are ways in which a truth can be conveyed, even in the face of mass denial (yes, I’m getting there).
Again though, “relativism” or not, I do think that “strength in numbers” is an assumption that science is predicated on, and this come at the expense of other disciplines and fields of human endeavor.
We will never rid the world of danger.
November 27th, 2007 at 2:32 pm
I’ll start by saying that this is one of your more well written posts, its less convoluted and more readable. But I’m with Dan on this one. Ya Galileo was right but if you can’t prove it you can;t blame his colleagues for not getting on board. Even in spiritual matters the scriptures function to help guide us through those issues, a prophet must be tested, God in the trinity etc. Theres got to be a safety or else you know “God told me to take an offering so I can get a Cadillac!!” It sucks that science keeps out good ideas but I also understand why, thats why its better to argue using their terms, its the only way to get anywhere.
November 27th, 2007 at 2:55 pm
“Even in spiritual matters the scriptures function to help guide us through those issues, a prophet must be tested, God in the trinity etc. Theres got to be a safety or else you know ‘God told me to take an offering so I can get a Cadillac!!’”
Hahaha! Cadillac!
Oh, I don’t deny the fact that someone can go, “It’s the truth, just trust me.” I’m certainly not saying that every form of “proving” is a waste of time. That would make no sense.
My mention of Galileo is he had proof, and that got him no where. When people are predisposed to disbelief, and are stuck in a certain mode of thought, proof doesn’t of itself amount to much.
The overarching point is this: take the example of Christ. We have a lot of really reasonable things we can point to to assert his reality in history and his Divinity. Sure, there’s a lot we can make use of for the purpose of apologetics.
But most of the world does not Believe. Does this mean there’s something wrong with the Truth itself? Well, no. It might mean that we’re not good evangelists or that Sin has placed people in a strangle hold. But if you were the only Christian, would that make Christ less true? Absolutely not. Reasonable proof aside, a truth is not “more true” because the majority of people adhere to it, nor is it more true because it has great potential for being believed — some truths are HARD to believe. “Hy husband would never cheat.” “God doesn’t condemn people.” “Trix ARE NOT just for kids.”
Truth is truth, not matter how bitter it might be, how many fans it might have, or how much “proof” of ac ertain kind can corroborate it.