philosophy in science: section 8
The great irony of the scientific method
What I’m about to suggest might seem, to some, absolutely outlandish, but I think if you follow the reasoning, you’ll see that there is some merit – that science is inherently self-defeating – inherently unscientific.
For something to be considered a scientifically valid hypothesis, if must meet a few requirements. The hypothesis must be testable and those tests must be repeatable. The results must be observable. The hypothesis must be falsifiable.
Now here is the irony:
The principals of the scientific method can not be applied to themselves to prove their complete validity and dependability, with regards to truth gathering (that is, all truth). However, if the scientific method is the only way of knowing, this dichotomy must not be so. Therefore, science as a hypothesis, is scientifically invalid.
Let’s go deeper. Science purports to, through its methods, offer truth. So the hypothesis is:
the scientific method, when followed, offers truth (and as some would have it, only the scientific method offers reliable and total truth).
Let’s examine some of the categories that make a question “scientific” (and yield others not scientific, therefor to Positivists and many in general, pointless).
Falsifiability
We have Karl Popper (to his credit, he was very much not a positivist, so we do not lump him in with those who this critique largely addresses) to thank for the concept of falsifiability. He was its biggest proponent, and saw it as a necessary answer to the foibles of “inductive reasoning.” His belief was that hypothesis is only scientific if it is falsifiable. Which means, a scientist is more concerned with finding evidence which would refute his claim, rather than prove it (which again, would only ever be induction). The longer he goes without being able to do so, the more “probable” his hypothesis is. So, falsifiability, as a criterion, is being able to at least conceive of an occasion in which you could observe negation. For example, the statement, “All humans are mortal,” is not falsifiable. You would have to observe every human for all of time to be able to falsify the hypothesis – not practical or possible. However the statement “All humans are immortal,” is falsifiable, since you would only need to observe one dead human to falsify the claim, and that is an occasion we can at least conceptualize (this example is from Wikipedia).
Let’s come back to our above stated hypothesis about science (whether science can offer truth, or only science can offer truth). We will see that it is not falsifiable, and certainly isn’t so in any sort of meaningful way which would accord with a scientists expectation. Science is not allowed to be, because, the scientific method has a safe-guard – error correction. Science is allowed to make mistakes and revise hypotheses, which I think is marvelous. Where would we be without the recourse, “back to the drawing board?” Self-correction is necessary, and thankfully, we have its luxury in the scientific method – but this means that the hypothesis can never be falsified, as science is allowed to produce error, and then go in a different direction thus negating our ability to observer and opposite occasion. We cannot conceive of a situation where science can be falsified as the path to all truth as it is allowed not to make conclusions, and can simply modify or develop a hypothesis. So, on this first account, science defeats itself in principal.
Testing and evaluation
Falsifiability is only one criterion and not everyone scientist belongs to the falsifiabilty camp. Of course the other (and really, the only other) viable method is testing and evaluation. You pose a hypothesis (as we have done) you test it, and you evaluate results. This is called induction, and it’s because of the weakness of it that Popper ran to the haven of falsifiability, where a scientist doesn’t have to be right, they just have to avoid being seen as wrong.
Now, let’s think about this new scenario, rationally – one would need to conduct and infinite amount of experiments on an infinite number of phenomena, an infinite number of times, and all ready know the results to be able to fact-check the outcome of those experiments with complete assurance of veracity, in order to determine that the scientific method was indeed thoroughly reliable in fulfillment of the hypothesis. This is the problem of induction – one needs to essentially be omniscient to rely on it, and if one was omniscient, one wouldn’t need to use the method at all.
I can’t see another way to determine its exclusive validity in truth discovery, as truth is complete, and if something – anything – cannot offer entirely infallible results, all results are up for scrutiny and we should not be readily convinced of any answer’s correctness, no matter how pragmatic the insight has been. Our hypothesis fails scientific scrutiny here as well.
Rational thought
I believe in it. You believe in it. Rational thought is not generally a disputive topic. However, science, cannot believe in it. Oh, I’m well aware that scientists use rational thought every day – the scientific process demands its use. It’s a crucial component, and any scientist will tell you so. But this is the dichotomy – rational thought is not a testable, observable, or quantifiable, property. Certainly not through anything the scientific world would have at its disposal to test with. We run into assumptive thinking, rooted in pragmatism.
I said this earlier in section 5:
“We can talk about rational thought. We all know what it means, or have some conception. We can analyse and scrutinize it with great vigour and precision. And yet, it is not quantifiable. There is no objective means by which we can evaluate and assert its existence, let alone its quality. On every account, it is an unscientific, and by definition, must be a non-empirical property. And yet the entirety of science is based on the reality and presence of rational thought.”
Please don’t misread me: I’m a firm believer in the reality of rational thought, but the tools of the scientific method cannot prove it – science cannot qualify or verify it – and yet it is a cornerstone. Without it, science is meaningless.
I simply finding astounding that proponents of the “sola science” doctrine can do so when the very thing it is predicated on is an unscientific property.
If rational thought does exist, but cannot not be vouched for scientifically, there must be other ways of knowing, that – though hitherto undiscussed – even science must be predicated on, but will not confess.
philosophy in science: introduction
philosophy in science: section 1
philosophy in science: section 2
philosophy in science: section 3
philosophy in science: section 4
philosophy in science: section 5
philosophy in science: section 6
philosophy in science: section 7
philosophy in science: section 8
philosophy in science: conclusion
tags: philosophy, science


November 26th, 2007 at 9:15 pm
Ben,
Much of what you write in this post only serves to support what Hume says about much of what we know being probabilistic - including the above statement.
You have still not answered my observation of history being an example of empirical but non-scientific inquiry. I suspect that most scientists accept historical truths. I doubt that Richard Dawkins will write a book decrying the teaching of World War II as fact.
What way of knowing do you propose that trumps the scientific method and, more important, empirical observation in general?
November 27th, 2007 at 9:03 am
“Much of what you write in this post only serves to support what Hume says about much of what we know being probabilistic - including the above statement.”
Yes and no:
1) He said that maximal probability was all we could be sure of. I still think we can be certain of things (and through other means than he enumerated).
2) He did not evaluate specific tenents of the modern day scientific method, that render it incoherent and self-refuting as a system of principals.
* * * * *
“history being an example of empirical but non-scientific inquiry”
I’m glad you reminded me of this as History provides a great example for “proof” and how meanginful it is.
Of course it’s empirical. That’s obvious. We don’t “reason” our way through it, it’s recorded — history by definition is a record.
But I want to suggest that actually accepting History, requires what I call “simple faith.” That is, since there are so many records, and so much subscription, it’s just common sense that X,Y, & Z events happened, and in more or less the fashion presented.
However, it is possible that they did not. I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but the possible always remains that even “important” historical events were manufactured — if Joseph Smith can have millions upon millions of Mormons convinced that there are multitudes of Jews buried in New York from an ancient battle — the story of only one man’s story — imagine what a sophisticated totalitarian government might be capable of.
Again, it might be a “stretch” but the fact remains that we were not there to see Napoleon or Julius Caesar or Artaxerxes — that doesn’t really matter though, as it’s common-sensical to believe that they did exist because of inherited empirical evidence. But this requires trust.
Would Dawkins subscribe to the fact that WW1 was myth? No. Because even he cannot live his life without embracing a belief system that takes him outside of his scientific principals.
Again, thankfully, you’ve brought up a point that corroborates mine — we have to lean on other ways of knowing. The living of life demands it.
* * * * *
“What way of knowing do you propose that trumps the scientific method and, more important, empirical observation in general?”
They’re valid and useful. They have a history of some success. I’m not suggesting that we replace them or discard them — I’m suggesting they need augmentation and accompaniment. One possible accompaniment being what has been explained in the previous section of this comment.
You’ll be happy to know, I only have a “summary/conclusion” left to post in this series, then I’ll being a series in the “Ways of Knowing,” that presents what kinds of knowledge, I believe, humans are capable of working with, and what those kinds of knowledge require as evidence.
At times it will be highly unscientific! But that’s a necessary requirement.
November 28th, 2007 at 11:00 am
“Simple Faith”?
Isn’t faith always simple? What is complex faith?
I can deduce from your description of simple faith that complex faith is faith in something that has a singular (or very few) distinct records. But I think that’s a misnomer. The act of faith itself is always a simple one. Easy faith and difficult faith might be a better way to describe these two ends of a spectrum.
November 28th, 2007 at 11:23 am
You have a point… faith is always “simple.”
What I’m drawing a line between is the faith you have when someone tells you their name and you believe them, and Faith in God.
Faith that your child is yours and not that of another man, and Faith that Christ is what he said he was.
There is “faith” that we need to have constantly, and without we become paranoid and nauseating “conspiracy theorists.” And then there is “big faith.”
All faith is simple, I agree with you there. Maybe I’ll think more on a qualifier that might be more clear.