philosophy in science: conclusion
So what are we left with? Just to be clear, I’ll restate the major points I’ve tried to establish thus far (sorry if my syntax is not technically right):
[A-1] Humans create knowledge – knowledge is all the mind can work with
[A-2] Use of the senses results in a certain kind of knowledge – particulate knowledge (that is, knowledge from our experience and interaction with particles)
[A-3] Particulate knowledge cannot contain information that the senses cannot capture
[A-4] Our senses do not inform us about everything that exists
[A-5] Humans are able to think apart from particulate knowledge
[A] Particulate knowledge is incomplete
[B1] Humans can only ask questions about what they can think about – that is, they can only ask certain questions
[B2] If we can only ask certain questions, we can only gather certain answers
[B3] As we can only assemble certain questions and answers, we then form certain expectations, inferences, and directives with regards to what can be discovered
[B] Our expectations, inferences, and directives are incomplete
[C1]Any system that advocates the the exclusivity of [A] and [B] is necessarily incomplete as to what knowledge it can form
[C2] Modern-day science claims to to be the path to objective truth
[C3] Modern-day science posits [A] and [B]
[C4] Modern-day science cannot satisfy its claim, that being [C3]
[C] Modern-day science is logically fallacious
* * *
Science, though invaluable to human progress and as a method to answer some “whys,” cannot answer every “why.”
Here is a very delicate point, but in closing, one that I would like to leave you with:
the presence of a why means that we have a faculty that can process the kind of answer that why
seeks. That is, is we can ask a certain question, it is proof of the validity and reality of that kind of knowledge. Now, this is not some veiled repackaging of the ontological argument – the objective is not to prove that the object of thought must exist. Rather it is to say that if, for example, we can ask about “particles,” then “particulate knowledge” is a valid kind of knowledge.
Let me be clear – we ask why. Science cannot answer every why – but still we ask. If we have the capacity to ask these other whys, whys that are outside the realm of science’s ability to answer, we must then have modes of knowledge that are other to those which science is composed of, or else we would not be able to ask these whys in the first place.
Inquiry proves faculty.
There must then be more ways of knowing than particulate knowledge and analytical/evaluative (that is, “rational”) knowledge, as we can ask whys that these two modes of knowledge cannot ascend to or contain.
* * *
This ends the series of philosophy in science. We will move on to what I think our other ways of knowing are.
philosophy in science: introduction
philosophy in science: section 1
philosophy in science: section 2
philosophy in science: section 3
philosophy in science: section 4
philosophy in science: section 5
philosophy in science: section 6
philosophy in science: section 7
philosophy in science: section 8
philosophy in science: conclusion
tags: knowing, philosophy, science, ways of knowing
“A-5] Humans are able to think apart from particulate knowledge
[A] Particulate knowledge is incomplete”
A does not follow from A-5. Descartes used a very similar argument that went along the lines of: Humans have imperfect minds, yet they can conceive of a perfect God, therefore God planted the idea, therefore God exists.
I know there are differences in Descartes argument and yours, please do not get hung up on that though. The reply to his argument applies in a similar fashion to yours. If we accept that the human mind is imperfect (which would seem to gel with the overall tenor of your argument), that the same mind conceives of something does not mean it exists. It may or may not exist but the ability of our faulty minds to conceive of something really doesn’t indicate much.
You will need to rework A.
Dan you’re missing the actual point. The example you used is trying to prove something that does not share any commonality.
Particulate knowledge must be incomplete if there are other kinds of knowledge outside of it.
I could re-word it:
Humans have other kinds of knowledge that differ from particulate knowledge.
Therefor, particulate knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge.
I’m explaining an epistemology here, not an ontology. I’m not trying to prove the reality of the object of thought, but rather categories of thought.
Mathematics is not contained in the category “particulate knowledge”. But math is real. Therefor, there are other categories of knowledge.
This is self-evident.
I could go on about several things, but my point still stands. We cannot know that kinds of knowledge exist simply because we can conceive of them, despite your conclusion that “we can ask whys that these two modes of knowledge cannot ascend to or contain.” Lots of people think that talking to the spirits of the dead is a way of knowing, that does not make it so, does it?
“Lots of people think that talking to the spirits of the dead is a way of knowing, that does not make it so, does it?”
You’re still missing my point, and swinging it toward objects of knowledge. The example your brought up confuses my point, and you seem to think I’m saying, “Conceivability means reality,” or “Conceivability means validity,” or, “I can imagine a certain reality (or proof of a certain reality) so it’s possible or plausibe.”
None of this is what I’m suggesting.
Talking. Spirit. The fact that we can inquire about these things proves that we can think about them.
It does not prove that Spirits exist. But it proves that we are capable of thinking about them. That’s all.
Inquiry proves capacity. You cannot ask about something you do not have the ability to think about. We could not ask math questions unless we could think about math. We could not ask questions about history unless we could think about history.
We could not ask about spirits unless we could think about them. That doesn’t mean they exist are not. But asking is impossible unless some other cognition comes first.
Can you state how this isn’t so? You believe that human questions do not require any sort of antecedent understanding or knowledge?
Do questions come from a vaccuum?