In follow up to my thoughts on probability as a theistic argument, it’s important to make one clarification. The goal, ultimately, is not so much to bring people to faith by logic (though logical defenses are important), but rather, to show that people come to logic by faith. Logic appears to be an objective, self-evident, inescapable fortress, because of an act of resignation. We are, at every turn, forced to resign ourselves to what seems likely; and not only that, but we are further compelled to treat what seems likely as actual. Logical apprehensions are, at their root, faith moves.

So, why one faith move seems more justified than another faith move it ultimately arbitrary. Certainly we can argue that 2+2=4 is a far more self-evident and obvious assertion than whether Jesus walked on water, but the path taken to get there is itself lined with tiny resignations. We are defending faith with faith.

I’d never quite thought about it this way, but it appears that question begging (assumption, circular reasoning) is actually a fundamental property of human rationality. Hmm.

The thrust of Plantinga’s notion of Warrant is essentially this: belief in God is “properly basic” and so belief in God is warranted. In saying a concept is properly basic, we mean it appears fundamental to human experience and thought, and is manifest across time and culture. This is why the Flying Spagetti Monster or Russell’s Teapot are not defeaters to the validity of belief; they’re not properly basic. They are arbitrary human inventions (and so too could be conceptions of the Abrahamaic God). However, the pure concept “God” extends far beyond an isolated, arbitrary whim.

The argument then is not that God must exist – or that a particular God does exist – rather, that belief is at the very least warranted.

I’ve been batting around a possible way to extend the argument a tad further.

Now, Plantinga also argues that since we readily accept that other people have minds – have consciousness – again, belief in God (being similar, albeit more grand) is warranted.

Even though I can test for the presence of consciousness, I can’t ever really prove that any person HAS consciousness as I do; that they truly have a perspective, are subjects, are self-referencing, self-aware, etc. I simply trust that fellow humans are conscious just as I am conscious.

This is, it seems, a probabilistic argument. Even though a decisive empirical observation of consciousness is impossible (in my view), the probability that a conscious mind is present in my neighbour is good enough.

I would suggest that not only is belief in my neighbour’s mind warranted, it is also valid, and “valid enough” to be considered true.

It appears to me that most every concept, be it a logical or scientific fact, carries with it a degree of probability. Apart from the statements, “something exists,” and, “nothing does not exist,” I’d be hard pressed to come up with another absolute; even logical proofs like A = A and A ≠ not A, are beginning to seem as though they might have probabilistic properties.

I say this for two reasons; one, logic necessarily seems self-evident and indefatigable. Just as space and time are necessary categories that allow for thought, so too is logic; but this seems circular to me. We cannot see around our own eyes. The validity of this is supported by the second reason, that being the rather “illogical” activity that takes place at the quantum level. While in the world of atoms logic holds, below it, logic appears to unravel. Causality goes bye bye. Something can be itself, and something else. Logic, then, does not hold in all occasions; it is not universal.

While I’m willing to allow that gaps might get filled in we may find an extremely logical foundation for the quantum, for the time being, let’s allow that it might be contra-logical.

“Might” being the keyword.

The implication is that logic itself may be probabilistic, meaning that it is probably true, but not necessarily true.

Now, the idea I’m playing with is that high probability equals high validity. Once something crosses a probabilistic threshold, we can consider it, for all intents and purposes, to be true.

Again, using logic as the example; not only is belief in logic warranted, but the probability of logic being true is so high that we can consider it valid, or better, we should consider it valid; and so, it ought to be believed.

Therefore, given the conditions that make belief in God warranted, I would argue that a probabilistic threshold further compels us to declare such belief to also valid.

I’m not sure if this holds up, and I’m not sure if Plantinga’s taken the argument that far (he might have). It’s just something I’ve been batting around the past few days.

I’m often baffled by the duality scientists so regularly inject into the Creation/Evolution discussion. They are swift to accuse proponents of Creation or Intelligent Design as offering a kind of “pseudo-science.” However, when defending their own ideas scientists offer in return a kind of “pseudo-philosophy.” The latter I find to be more problematic. The foundation of an idea is more critical than the idea itself. In the excerpt from his book Finding Darwin’s God, Kenneth Miller presents several arguments on the topic, and each one is predicated on a very weak philosophical and theological foundation.

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Recently at City of God, in an article about how political sides are chosen, the author cited this article by John Haidt, explaining where our moral imperatives (things like justice, respect, loyalty) could possibly come from, via the evolutionary mechanism. Though I think this (evolution) can be a quite shaky platform to build any sort of epistemic or moral system on (and though it can often be an intellectual cop-out), the article was rather interesting. One statement just jumped out at me:

“..to explain why we don’t like to see suffering and often care for people who are not our children”

It is interesting that, globally and throughout history, people have extended care to others, unwarranted and undeserved.

An interesting explanation can be found in I and Thou, by Martin Buber. In this masterwork he outlines what the relation between humans should be, but what it (sadly) often is. He uses three short words to accomplish this objective: I, You, It.

How we should relate to each other, is seen in the I-You relation (this is also how we are to relate to God). It is, in the simplest terms, the purity of the relation of Being. No adjectives, no categories, no goals or agendas or conquests. However, what we are most used to is the I-It modality, in which we experience everything in objectified, codified terms.

What does this have to do with care? Well, I think the obligation so many of us feel at times, happens when the “I” in me sees the “I” in you. That is, when spirit speaks to spirit and we realize that something foundational is shared; that we extend into each other, somehow. We are often too self-involved to really tune in to this groaning within us, but it is this, our shared Being (the fact that we Are, that we are Human, and that we are grounded existentially in God), that compels even the most wicked to, at times, become capable of great acts of care.